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The mantle of heir to Darwin’s famous theory of evolution by natural selection is generally claimed by the so-
called neo-Darwinism that derives from the Modern Synthesis, announced by Huxley, Dobzhansky, Mayr and
others in the 1930s and 1940s. Its most distinctive theses are the unlimited power of natural selection to explain
evolutionary change and adaptation, and the unique role of the gene as the currency in which evolution is to be
measured. Uncompromising versions of both these ideas are well known from Richard Dawkins’ classic, The
Selfish Gene ([1976]). Dissatisfaction with this version of neo-Darwinism has been growing rapidly in recent
years, however, especially as advances in both molecular and developmental biology have made increasingly
clear that the image of the gene that underlies the second thesis is entirely misguided.
In Organisms, Agency and Evolution , Denis Walsh provides an admirably clear and well-informed account of
neo-Darwinism and its failings, and develops as an alternative a view he calls Situated Darwinism. Central to
Situated Darwinism is something that was an integral part of Darwin’s own view, but has been lost in neo-
Darwinism, namely, the vital role of the organism. The core aim of this book is to reinstate the organism in its
rightful place.
The great virtue of neo-Darwinism, according to Walsh, though ultimately also its fatal vice, is what he calls the
‘fractionation’ of evolution, the way in which defining evolution in terms of genes enables it to be divided into
component processes—development, inheritance, adaptation, and the generation of novelty—that can be
treated independently from one another (pp. 72–3). Notoriously, development is black-boxed by neo-Darwinism,
since it is assumed that the developed phenotype is determined, more or less, by the genes. Further, as
evolution is defined in terms of changes in gene frequencies, inheritance, in so far as it is relevant to evolution,
can be defined solely as transmission of genes. Selection, again by definition, is the differential survival of fitter
genes, so that in the end the phenotypic traits caused by these genes must be better adapted to their
environments than their predecessors. And evolutionary novelty, finally, can only be grounded in changes to
genes. The Weismann barrier—the assumption officially turned dogma by Francis Crick that genetic information
could only travel from germ cells to somatic cells, never in the reverse direction—meant that only changes
directly to germ cells could be inherited. Moreover, since the germ cells were not directly involved in any
functional activities of the organism, it appeared that such changes could only be random; only by luck could they
be adaptive.
Walsh is scrupulously careful to give due credit to the Modern Synthesis. For example, after showing that there
are multiple channels of inheritance in addition to the transmission of genes that can underlie evolutionary
change, he insists nonetheless that neo-Darwinists can reply, on the basis of their proprietary concept of
inheritance, that ‘any phenomenon that is not underwritten by the transmission of genes […] is just not
inheritance. This commitment is justified and rightly earned by the success of the Modern Synthesis’ (p. 102).
Personally, I am a bit more sceptical about this success. Certainly, the centrality of the gene concept, despite its
growing empirical problems, has been extremely productive in molecular and developmental biology. Whether
population genetics, the theoretical activity at the core of neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory, has borne
comparably nutritious fruit is more debatable. But it is no doubt good strategy to be as placatory as possible to
the neo-Darwinists, given their continuing powerful role in evolutionary discussion and notorious hostility to
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serious dissent.
At any rate, despite such respectful gestures, Walsh aims to bury neo-Darwinism, not to praise it, and he
provides a compelling overview of the growing problems that confront that research programme. In particular,
and in accordance with the objective of reasserting the centrality of the organism, Walsh consistently argues that
the various components of evolution cannot in fact be separated in the way that neo-Darwinism proposes. So,
for instance, he defends inheritance holism, according to which, ‘The pattern of inheritance is held in place by the
self-regulating, adaptive activities of organisms embedded in their environments. Genes have an important role
to play in the reliable production of phenotypes, but it is not a role that can be differentiated, and detached, from
any other components of the system’ (p. 112).
This move from reductionistic and mechanistic atomism to a holistic alternative that provides equal status to top-
down explanations permeates Walsh’s full-blooded defence of the organism. One of the most original and
interesting lines of argument starts with the idea that a traditionally information-based gene-centrism might be
defended by way of David Lewis’s game-theoretic account of meaning, and the suggestion that genes be
interpreted as signs with imperative force. Genes, in short, and as suggested by familiar metaphors such as
blueprints and recipes, give the orders. But in fact, Walsh convincingly argues, things are exactly the other way
around. Developmental systems secure the reliable re-production of organisms in the face of a range of
unpredictable circumstances by regulating genes. The empirical basis for such a claim will be familiar to those
who have encountered works such as James Shapiro’s Evolution ([2011]), in which he describes the genome as
a read/write storage system.
Conservative evolutionists will probably be most disturbed by Walsh’s downgrading of the importance of natural
selection. Contrary to Elliott Sober’s ([1984]) influential account of natural selection as a force acting on
populations, Walsh sees it as a ‘higher order effect’. That is to say, it is no more than a summation of all the
individual births, deaths, and reproductions within the population. This doesn’t imply that its results may not be
predictable. Just as the pressure on a container of gas is nothing beyond the impacts on its walls of individual
molecules, it is nonetheless possible to make precise predictions as to what their joint effect is. Indeed, as Walsh
stresses, there are important explanations that appeal to higher-order effects; but such explanations do not
require the positing of additional population-level causes.
Where this deflationary account of natural selection has bite is with respect to adaptation. It remains common to
hear that natural selection is not merely the cause of adaptation, but the only possible cause of adaptation.
Clearly this is not compatible with its being merely a higher-order effect, since on that view it is not a cause at all.
There is, I think, an obvious but remarkably neglected point here: selection could not be a cause of adaptation,
because it can only apply at all if some other cause has provided the adapted phenotypes to be selected. The
view that selection causes adaptation really conceals a quite different substantive claim, namely, that small
random mutations are sufficient to take a population between arbitrary points in phenotypic space. As it becomes
increasingly clear that states of genes do not generally determine phenotypic traits, this claim becomes
increasingly hard to defend.
Walsh, on the other hand, argues that adaptation is a result of heritable adaptive tendencies, adaptive plasticity,
in the development of organisms. Although he doesn’t use the word often, this proposal is thoroughly
Lamarckian, at least in the popular sense of involving the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and thereby
violates one of the most deeply felt norms in contemporary science. This shunned destination is reached by an
equally disreputable route: Walsh believes that organisms are agents, and that their proper understanding
requires teleological principles of explanation.
It is interesting to contrast Walsh’s arguments for the importance of teleology with the somewhat notorious ones
presented recently by Thomas Nagel ([2012]). Whereas the latter were offered in a broadly East Coast Mysterian
spirit, grounded in a proud ignorance of vulgar scientific details, Walsh reaches his teleological conclusions from
a deep and serious engagement with empirical science. A growing wealth of evidence shows that organisms are
developmentally plastic systems capable of generating novel ways to maintain a proper fit with their environment
and their conditions of existence, and of providing ways of passing on such novelties to their descendants. The
range and limits of such capacities remain very much a matter for further investigation, but the existence of such
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capacities is beyond serious dispute, and it is increasingly plausible that regularities in terms of the end state
that a system will reach must remain an inescapable complement to the more mechanistic accounts of particular
routes by which such states are reached under particular circumstances.
As I have indicated, Walsh’s respectful treatment of the Modern Synthesis will not save him from the ire of those
whose fondest convictions he attempts to violate. Nonetheless, his critique reflects a growing consensus among
a large body of more critical evolutionary theorists, and in the light of such criticisms his positive arguments for
the centrality of the organism, for its central role in driving evolutionary change, and for the necessity of a
perspective on the organism as an agent are worthy of very serious attention. This is an important book that will
advance current debates about evolutionary theory in productive directions.
Without (as yet) being fully convinced by all of the central theses, I don’t find much in this book with which I want
to take serious issue beyond a slightly irritating number of typos and missing words. In some places, technical
language might have been avoided and thereby increased the potential audience for the book. But my main
concerns were of omission rather than commission, and these are readily excusable given the ambition and
breadth of the book (a breadth, by the way, that greatly exceeds what it has been possible to discuss in this
review).
It was surprising that Walsh does not say more about epigenetics. Indeed, the topic was discussed just once,
mainly in relation to Conrad Waddington’s famous epigenetic landscapes (p. 136). More recent work on
epigenetics would surely have been very helpful to the general thesis, both as demonstrating the contingency of
gene to phenotype relations, and as potentially linking developmental plasticity to inheritance. Also related to
Waddington, it would have been good to hear a little about earlier organism-centred views of evolution,
especially the organicist tradition that flourished in the first half of the twentieth century, and which included
figures such as J. S. Haldane, Joseph Needham, Paul Weiss, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and Waddington himself.
As is almost mandatory in these debates, Walsh claims that he is recovering lost insights of Darwin; but the
centrality of the organism remained an important idea at least until, say, 1953.
On the excuse that many of these early organicists were also more or less committed to process ontologies of
various kinds, I shall allow myself a few lines, finally, to grind my own currently favourite axe. Many of the ideas
Walsh develops cry out for embedding within an explicitly process biology. The kind of agents that constitute
Walsh’s organisms, actively exploring their relations to their conditions of existence, sound much more like
processes than objects, something he acknowledges in a more recent paper (Walsh [forthcoming]). Walsh sees
the organism as ‘commingled’ with its conditions of existence (or affordances) and holds that to understand this
commingling requires abandoning the oppositions of structure and function, inner and outer, and conservatism
and change (p. 184). Commingling is hard to describe in a traditional substance, or thing, ontology, but is no
problem at all for a process ontology. And in such a context these oppositions, most notably that between
structure and function, fall away with little resistance. Plasticity as a means to stability (p. 195) seems
paradoxical in a substance ontology, but makes perfect sense in a process ontology, wherein what requires
explanation is stability at least as much as change.
But to repeat, this is not a book that could expect to satisfy everyone perfectly. It takes on an important target in a
systematic way and, having comprehensively dismantled this, offers an alternative vision of the entire field of
evolutionary biology. Few people are going to accept fully both aspects of the project. However, there is a
widespread, if certainly not universal, sense that evolutionary theory is overdue for a fundamental rethink and
among those of this opinion, Walsh’s book will provide a serious possible way forward. Philosophers of biology,
evolutionary theorists, and anyone interested in the state of the field and with a reasonable grasp of the specialist
vocabulary, will need to read this book.
John Dupré
Egenis
University of Exeter
J.A.Dupre@exeter.ac.uk
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